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Abstract
This study finds that North Korea’s nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have 
had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before 
North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have 
cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with 
time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North 
Korea’s trade with its two principal partners. 
In retrospect, North Korea may have calculated quite correctly that the direct penalties for establishing itself 
as a nuclear power would be modest (or, alternatively, put such a high value on demonstrating its nuclear 
capability that it outweighed the downside risks, however large). If sanctions are to deter behavior in the 
future, they will have to be much more enthusiastically implemented.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 9, 2006, despite warnings not to proceed by its principal economic benefactors, China and 
South Korea, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test. Before the test, it was widely believed 
that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications in Asia, possibly even prefiguring war. 
On the day of the test, the South Korean stock market dropped, but it began rising the next day, and 
regained the lost ground the following week. The markets in the rest of Asia were largely unaffected.
Five days later on October 14, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1718 imposing economic sanctions, specifically imposing a ban on the exportation of large-
scale arms-related goods, technology, and services, and luxury goods, as well as the importation of North 
Korean heavy arms (UN 2006). 
These developments could have been expected to attenuate North Korea’s trade with the rest of the 
world: The sanctions specifically prohibited the importation and exportation of certain products to North 
Korea, and the nuclear tensions might have been expected to raise the risk premium on economic interaction 
with the North, suppressing exchange, especially involving foreign partner private-sector entities, even with 
respect to activities not directly covered by the sanctions. Such reactions could have been motivated both by 
the firms’ anticipation of possible restrictive actions or guidance by their home governments, as well as their 
own heightened assessments of risks regarding business with North Korean counterparties.
Whether or not these effects materialized is an important issue: If sanctions are toothless or major 
powers acquiesce in the face of such provocations, it makes deterring North Korea all the more difficult 
in future conflicts as well as establishes an unwelcome precedent for other countries contemplating 
emulation.
This paper examines the empirical evidence on North Korean trade both before and after the 
nuclear test with its two neighbors and principal trade partners, China and South Korea, which together 
account for nearly half of the country’s merchandise trade (Haggard and Noland 2008, table 1). The 
results suggest that for better or worse, the North Koreans correctly calculated that the penalties of 
their nuclear action, at least in this primary sphere, would be trivial to the point of being undetectable, 
potentially establishing a very unwelcome precedent both with respect to their future behavior as well as 
that of potential emulators.
SANCTIONS BACKGROUND
During the 1993–94 nuclear crisis, the sanctions option was considered but ultimately not pursued. 
Policymakers in the United States, Japan, and South Korea all feared a violent and possibly preemptive 
North Korean response to the imposition of sanctions (North Korea repeatedly threatened a war that 
would turn Seoul into “a sea of fire”).1 Moreover, there were concerns about the possible ineffectiveness 
of sanctions, either due to Chinese (and Russian) unwillingness to support them in the Security Council 
or the unwillingness of provincial authorities in northeast China to implement a sanctions policy. 
Nevertheless, the United States, Japan, and South Korea discussed the possibility of pursuing limited 
sanctions outside UN purview in the event that China was unwilling to enforce sanctions, presaging the 
Proliferation Security Initiative a decade later (Sigal 1998).
 By the time of the July 2006 missile tests, attitudes had hardened considerably. In 2003, in 
response to North Korean diplomatic recalcitrance, China allegedly cut off an oil pipeline to North Korea 
briefly (Funabashi 2007). China had also cooperated in the September 2005 investigation into North 
Korean assets at Banco Delta Asia located in Macau, one of China’s two special administrative regions, 
and subsequently allegedly froze North Korean accounts in a Chinese bank (Suh 2006). 
Before the July missile firings, China publicly and privately warned North Korea not to proceed. 
When the North Koreans went ahead, China (and Russia) supported the adoption of UN sanctions 
(Resolution 1695—targeted sanctions on missile proliferators). Although China blocked more sweeping 
proposals from the United States and Japan, one observer characterized the erosion in North Korea’s 
diplomatic support as a “momentous move” (Hayes 2006). The sanctions were the strongest reprimand 
of North Korea by the Security Council since 1950, and clearly represented an escalating response on the 
part of the United Nations.
When in October 2006 North Korea announced its intention to test a nuclear device, the UNSC 
issued a vague warning, which could have been interpreted as alluding to the prospect of tightened 
sanctions (Choi and Lee 2007). One prominent observer predicted that such a test could lead to military 
action by the United States and possibly South Korea as well.2 As it had in the case of the July 2006 
missile tests, China cautioned North Korea not to proceed, warning of “grave consequences” if it did so.3 
When North Korea once again defied Chinese wishes, Beijing described the act as “flagrant and 
brazen” and supported more robust sanctions—though as in the case of the July missile tests, with a less 
severe package than that proposed by the United States and Japan. Resolution 1718 was passed relatively 
quickly in six days. The resolution imposed an embargo on exports of heavy weapons, dual-use items, and 
luxury goods to North Korea, as well as the importation of heavy weapons systems from North Korea. 
The administration of the sanctions was left up to the individual sanctioning countries. Russia, for 
1. South Korea took some of these threats sufficiently seriously to put its military forces on alert in June 1994. See Sigal 
1998 and Oberdorfer 1997. 
2. Michael A. Levi in a Council on Foreign Relations Interview, “North Korea Nuclear Test Could Lead to Military 
Response from U.S.,” October 3, 2006, available at www.cfr.org (accessed on December 10, 2008).
3. Joseph Kahn, “North’s Test Seen as Failure for Korea Policy China Followed,” New York Times, October 9, 2006, 
available at www.nytimes.com (accessed on December 10, 2008).
example, defined “luxury goods” so narrowly (fur coats costing more than $9,637, watches costing nearly 
$2,000) that the sanctions’ bite was questionable (Choi and Lee 2007). Due to Chinese opposition, 
Article 42 of Chapter VII, which allows the use of military enforcement action, was not included despite 
US and Japanese support, and Chinese UN Ambassador Wang Guangya expressed hesitation about full 
implementation (Choi and Lee 2007, International Crisis Group 2006). South Korea announced that 
in addition to the sanctions it would suspend food and fertilizer aid, though it would continue with 
other economic cooperation projects. North Korean UN Ambassador Park Gil-yon called the resolution 
“gangster-like” and the Foreign Ministry released a statement reiterating that sanctions were an act of war 
and threatening “a merciless strike” against any implementer of the UN resolution.4
The chair of the UN sanctions committee, Italian Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, subsequently 
advised that 71 countries and the European Union had submitted reports on their implementation 
activities (UNSC 2007). China’s report was notable in its lack of detail, however, and some countries 
such as Iran and Ethiopia, with past histories of North Korean weapon systems procurement, did not 
submit reports. 
In sum, in the face of repeated North Korean provocations and despite the apparent reluctance of 
some countries, the United Nations had adopted increasingly stringent sanctions—and the stage had been 
set for bolder future action. The widely respected International Crisis Group (2006) opined: “Should the 
North test again, the Security Council would likely pass a new resolution with more sweeping sanctions 
and perhaps language authorizing enforcement by military means.” The implication is that the activities 
of traders and investors in North Korea would be continually exposed to the vagaries of Pyongyang’s 
decision making, which, for whatever reason, has consistently elevated diplomatic over economic goals, as 
illustrated by the recent interference in the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
ASSESSING IMPACT
It is less clear how much of an impact on commerce the sanctions actually had, however.5 It goes without 
saying that South Korea does not export weapons to North Korea, and in recent years, China has not 
reported the export of heavy arms either.6 Luxury goods are a different story, however. China and South 
Korea did not publish detailed lists of sanctioned luxury goods, but a number of other countries did. As 
shown in table 1, these lists exhibit considerable consistency across countries.
In the absence of a Chinese list of sanctioned luxury goods, as an illustration figure 1 reports 
4. BBC News, “Full Text: North Korea statement,” October 17, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed on 
December 10, 2008).
5. Data sources are documented in the appendix.
6. In 2007 China reported arms and ammunition exports to North Korea of $20,000 consisting entirely of cartridges for 
shotguns.
Chinese exports of luxury goods to North Korea defined in three ways. The first variant (“Australian 
list—SITC”) takes the Australian list in table 1 and maps the verbal description of the sanctioned luxury 
products to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories. (Australia was selected for this 
exercise as a middle power with diplomatic relations with North Korea; its list also has the virtue of being 
specified in simple terms, facilitating concordance to SITC categories). The second variant (“Japanese 
list”) is based on KOTRA (2006), which attempted to map the Japanese sanctions list to detailed product 
categories using the Harmonized System (HS) (Kim 2006). The third variant (“Australian list—HS”) 
reconstructs the Australian list using KOTRA’s HS codes, which tend to be more narrowly drawn than 
the SITC-based categories used to construct the Australian SITC list. 
As can be seen in figure 1, Chinese exports of luxury goods to North Korea did not fall to zero in 
2007 under any variant; indeed, luxury goods exports increased between 2006 and 2007 under all three 
definitions. Resolution 1718 appears to have had no impact on Chinese behavior.
Beyond the direct impact of the sanctions narrowly construed, it is plausible that the ratcheting 
up of political tensions and the prospect of tightening sanctions, or even military action should there 
be future provocations, would drive up the risk premium on exchange with North Korea and deter 
commerce in areas not directly subject to sanctions. Monthly data on bilateral trade between North 
Korea and China, and North and South Korea are shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively. The data exhibit 
significant month-to-month volatility and strong seasonal patterns—trade volumes drop off in the winter 
possibly due to slowdowns of economic activity or, particularly in the case of China, the impassibility of 
unpaved roads on the North Korean side of the border. It is not apparent from figures 2 and 3 that the 
imposition of sanctions had any impact on trade flows, particularly once the expected winter decline in 
activity is taken into account.
However, figures 2 and 3 also illustrate that North Korean trade was generally on an upward trend. 
It is possible that statistical models could detect an impact of the imposition of sanctions and the more 
general increase in political risk that might not be apparent to the eye. Simple models incorporating 
only a time trend, seasonal dummies, and a dummy variable for the post–nuclear test/sanctions period 
are reported in tables 2 (China) and 3 (South Korea).7 Two variants are reported: the first based on the 
original monthly trade data, and a second in which the data have been cumulated on a quarterly basis for 
use in subsequent models where other variables are available only on a quarterly basis. There are positive 
time trends in all of the regressions and some evidence of seasonality as well. In the monthly data there 
appear to be some declines in activity in the winter months.8 
7. The equivalent exercise cannot be conducted on the luxury goods data because in contrast to the aggregate data reported 
in figures 2 and 3, the disaggregated product-specific data are only available for annual observations.
8. Not surprisingly, given the simplicity of these models, in some of the regressions there is evidence of autocorrelated 
residuals, which means that the estimated standard errors are likely to be biased downward, and as a consequence the 
In most cases these models detect no significant change in trade flows following the nuclear test and 
the imposition of UN sanctions (i.e., the null hypothesis of a zero-valued coefficient on the test/sanctions 
dummy could not be rejected), and in regressions 2.1 (monthly Chinese exports to North Korea), 3.2 and 
3.4 (South Korean imports from North Korea), the post-test period is actually associated with larger than 
expected trade volumes.9 
A more complete characterization of trade behavior would take the level of economic activity 
explicitly into account; trade is not only a function of sanctions, but also of macroeconomic performance. 
North Korea can be considered a “small country” in that its imports are so small relative to the exports 
of either of its principal partners (less than 0.25 percent of total exports in both cases) that it is a “price 
taker” facing a perfectly elastic supply of exports at a parametrically given price (figure 4). This justifies the 
use of a single equation-reduced form in which observed variations in trade volumes (figure 4, Q0gQ3) 
reflect shifts in the demand curve tracing along a horizontal supply curve (figure 4, Q0gQ1), and price 
variations are solely due to shifts in the supply curve along the demand curve (figure 4, Q0gQ2). This 
model can be formulated algebraically as:
log Mt
d = α0+α1log(PM/P)t+α2logYt       
where 
Mt
d    = quantity of imports demanded
PM/P    = relative price of imports
Yt      = an index of domestic activity
The export case is more complicated: Trade with China and South Korea looms sufficiently large 
in the North Korean economy that China and South Korea presumably face an upward-sloping North 
Korean supply curve (i.e., the magnitude of their demands are such that external demand shifts actually 
affect North Korean internal prices). In modeling terms this possibility implies the need to estimate 
demand and supply simultaneously. Given this increase in analytical complexity, the fact that the UN 
sanctions were mainly on exports to North Korea, not imports from North Korea, and that there are 
no qualitative differences in the estimated results for export and import trade, for the sake of brevity, 
consideration of North Korean exports to China and South Korea has been set aside to focus on trade 
moving in the other direction. 
reported level of statistical significance is exaggerated. For obvious reasons this is a bigger issue for the regressions on 
monthly data.
9. In the case of the two regressions on monthly data (2.1 and 3.2) this is subject to the caveat regarding autocorrelated 
residuals and exaggerated statistical significance noted in footnote 8. 
Tables 4 and 5 report regressions incorporating only the North Korean economic activity term, 
derived by quarterly interpolations of Bank of Korea annual GDP growth estimates. The inclusion of 
the activity renders the time trend insignificant and reduces the autocorrelation of the residuals to an 
acceptable level. The estimated income elasticities are extremely large (i.e., in terms of figure 4, the shift 
Q0gQ1). One possibility is that the impact of omitted variables is being misattributed to the activity 
term.
There are three obvious possibilities for the fact that changes in North Korean income appear 
to have a very large impact on the demand for imports. The first is that behavior of North Korean 
households and importing firms has been changing during the sample period; specifically, exposure to 
new products from China and South Korea has in effect boosted the demand for imports. Something 
quite similar to this was observed in Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany in the days following 
unification, when the suddenly enhanced availability of new Western products led to a massive shift in 
consumer preferences away from home goods (Dornbusch and Wolf 1994). As a consequence, an upsurge 
in demand may have swamped any impact of sanctions. 
A second, related possibility, which also echoes the German experience, is that the development 
of new institutional channels of trade has greatly reduced transaction costs, and this secular decline in 
transaction costs, possibly together with a shift in consumer preferences, has led to an upsurge in the 
demand for imports, which in these regressions is being captured in the activity term. Again, such effects 
may have overridden the impact of sanctions. 
The third possibility is that as a high-inflation economy with a fixed nominal exchange rate, North 
Korea is by definition experiencing real exchange rate appreciation. For North Korea, the relative price of 
imports is a function of foreign prices converted to North Korean won via an exchange rate, P*E/P. With 
the nominal rate, E, unchanged, the movement in the real exchange rate, P*E/P, would be a function 
of differential change in the foreign and local price levels, P* and P, respectively. This real appreciation 
may have driven a growth in the demand for imports and has not been captured in the preceding 
specifications. The situation is complicated further by the existence of both an official nominal exchange 
rate and a parallel or black-market rate. 
The problem is that we cannot observe P, North Korean prices, directly. Hence one solution would 
be to use movements in the black-market exchange rate as a proxy for changes in the unobservable 
domestic price level, P. This is not perfect: In a high-inflation environment, demand for foreign exchange 
as a relatively liquid “safe haven” investment may outstrip both domestic prices and the prices of 
imported goods, and as a consequence, movement in the black-market value of the won (which in fact 
depreciated continuously over the sample period) may be an upwardly biased measure of inflation.10 
10. The classic reference is Bresciani-Turroni (1937).
In table 6, the log inverse black-market exchange rate is added to the specifications reported in 
tables 4 and 5 (i.e., an increase in the value is an appreciation and would be expected to be associated 
with a larger volume of imports). As can be seen in table 6, this variable is not statistically significant. 
In terms of figure 4, this indicates that the changes in trade volumes are driven by the income shift 
Q0gQ1 while price effects, Q0gQ2, are imperceptible. It could be that the black-market exchange 
rate is not a good proxy for the unobservable domestic price level. Another possibility is that trade is 
occurring contemporaneously at both the official exchange rate as well as the black-market rate. In such 
circumstances, real exchange rates calculated using either official or black-market rates will be a noisy 
proxy for the actual rate imbedded in the trade.  
The models reported in tables 4, 5, and 6 assume that all adjustment to variations in activity 
and prices occurs within a single quarter; a large literature examines the issue of noncontemporaneous 
adjustment of trade to changes in the levels of economic activity and relative prices (Goldstein and Khan 
1985). There are two basic approaches to estimating these relationships. The first is to estimate distributed 
lags of each explanatory variable directly. The second is to include a lagged dependent variable on the right 
hand side, imposing the same long-run geometric adjustment pattern on all of the independent variables. 
The conventional wisdom is that variations in activity levels feed through to trade flows 
relatively quickly, while the impact of relative price changes takes longer to manifest. In the case at 
hand, the exchange rate term was never statistically significant either contemporaneously (table 6) or 
noncontemporaneously (not reported for the sake of parsimony). There is some evidence of lagged 
adjustment with respect to the income term, but permitting noncontemporaneous adjustment has no 
significant effect on the nuclear test/sanctions coefficient. 
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS EXTENSIONS
As shown in figures 2 and 3, North Korea’s trade volumes have shown an upward trend. It is possible 
that these trends in the key trade and income series are so pronounced that the series are said to be 
nonstationary, and hence simple ordinary least squares estimates such as those reported in tables 2 
through 6 are biased and inconsistent (Hamilton 1994). It is possible to test for and take into account 
the nature of nonstationarity; in particular that two series are cointegrated processes, and thus generate 
unbiased and consistent estimates. However, the relatively short time series makes implementation of 
modern time-series techniques problematic. 
The first step is to test for the presence of so-called unit roots in the series. The Dickey-Fuller 
test assumes that such roots are present; the null hypotheses can be rejected at high levels of statistical 
confidence in the income series, but there is weak evidence of trend in the trade series. As a first pass, 
the quarterly series were differenced by four lags (to generate stationary series and take care of possible 
seasonality) and the regressions estimated. As shown in table 7, there is no evidence that trade trends 
changed after the nuclear test and the imposition of sanctions, though there is evidence of increasing 
sensitivity of imports from China to the level of economic activity in North Korea.
Given that the evidence of unit roots both in the income and trade series is weak, it is unlikely 
that a cointegrating relationship is present. And indeed, in the Johansen test for cointegration, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected in the China regressions; however, in the South Korean 
regressions, the null can be rejected: There is evidence of cointegration. Given the small sample size and 
the possibly problematic nature of the data, this confounding result (a cointegrating relationship despite 
the absence of a unit root for one of the series) is presumably spurious. 
CONCLUSIONS
Beginning with visual inspection and ending with the most sophisticated time-series models that can be 
implemented given the weakness of the data, no evidence has been found that economic sanctions by the 
UN Security Council have had any effect on either North Korea’s trade in luxury goods with its largest 
trade partner, China, nor any indirect effect on North Korea’s aggregate trade with its two principal 
partners. 
From one perspective, the lack of robust results is perhaps unsurprising: The sanctions were limited 
to exports of military and luxury goods, with the definitions of these products and the administration of 
the sanctions left up to individual UN members. Perhaps some impact could be uncovered by focusing 
on narrow product categories, and restricting politically sensitive military and luxury products might have 
had some impact on regime behavior even if sanctions did not bite at the level of aggregate trade, but in 
the case at hand, even this modest result is questionable.
But sanctions were not the only channel through which the test could have affected trade flows: 
One would have thought that the test and sanctions would have generally increased the risk premium on 
all forms of economic engagement with North Korea, but the evidence does not bear this out. Enterprises 
in China and South Korea appear to have shrugged off the test, much as the financial markets did. 
It is possible that the governments of China and South Korea undertook actions to offset or 
minimize the private risks faced by individual firms and enterprises. This is more plausible in the case 
of South Korea than China: There are a relatively limited number of South Korean firms engaged in 
trade or investment with North Korea and they operate through government-controlled programs that 
would facilitate the socialization of risk. Although the South Korean government did carry through on 
a threat to curtail humanitarian assistance, it did not impose sanctions on the nominally commercial 
trade associated with the Kaesong Industrial Complex—a decidedly mixed message that the critics of the 
Roh Moo-hyun government were quick to observe. It is less obvious that this explanation is plausible 0
with respect to China: Much of China’s economic interaction with North Korea comes through small, 
largely self-financed and effectively private firms, and it is not at all obvious what kind of policy tools are 
available to socialize risk in this case. Indeed, survey evidence from other research suggests strongly that 
Chinese enterprises do not have recourse against losses in their North Korean business.
Even if the sanctions did not impede trade, counterfactually their existence may have deterred 
North Korea’s partners from relaxing barriers further, in effect, blocking trade that would have otherwise 
developed.
It is also possible that the test and the subsequent ratcheting up of political tensions increased 
the risk premium on trade with North Korea but that the models are just too crude to capture them: 
The sample period under the sanctions regime is relatively short, and hence the power of the statistical 
tests comparing behavior before and after the test may be low. But the apparent steady growth in trade 
throughout the period in question does not suggest a major shift in behavior, regardless of the power of 
the statistical tests. More plausibly, it may also be the case that in light of the change of government in 
Seoul, South Korean behavior may change. Whether the current Lee Myung-bak government would react 
in a fashion similar to its predecessor is questionable. In some sense these considerations are subject to 
self-correction: As time goes by, more sanctions-period observations will become available, and eventually 
the sanctions may well be removed, generating additional sample variation for modeling.
Nor should these results be interpreted as suggesting that all economic sanctions are useless. In 
contrast to the UN trade sanctions, evidence suggests that the disruptions to financial flows associated 
with the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case had economic and possibly political impact. Accounts at BDA 
were associated with missile proliferation (Pinkston 2008), unrecorded gold sales (Haggard and Noland 
2007, appendix A), and allegedly Kim Jong-il’s political slush fund (Chestnut 2007).11 Apart from 
disrupting these activities, the financial shock led to a fall in the black-market value of the won, put a 
squeeze on legitimate commerce (Cowie 2006), and reportedly necessitated a scaling back of festivities 
associated with Kim Jong-il’s birthday. More importantly, the accounts of the Six Party Talks reveal a 
strong North Korean interest in resolving the BDA issue and a willingness to make concessions to do so.
Nevertheless, the central message that emerges from this analysis is that the pre-test conventional 
wisdom that a North Korean nuclear test would resonate dramatically appears to have been misguided. 
Despite pre-test diplomatic warnings not to test, the post-test behavior of public- and private-sector 
actors in China and South Korea has been accepting of North Korea’s nuclear status. The test and even 
the imposition of limited sanctions do not appear to have had a perceptible effect on the country’s trade 
relationships with its two principal partners. If such warnings are to be heeded in the future, they must 
11. Also see Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2006, available at www.
nytimes.com (accessed on December 10, 2008).
embody credible threats of penalty. In the present case, of course, a major problem appears to be that 
some of the permanent members of the Security Council, particularly China, displayed reluctance to fully 
embrace and implement sanctions.
North Korea may have calculated quite correctly that the direct penalties for establishing itself 
as a nuclear power would be modest indeed. Presumably this experience will condition North Korean 
policymakers’ reactions in the future, making deterrence on this issue and other sources of conflict more 
difficult. Sanctions, fecklessly applied, may be worse than useless: They could actually encourage other 
states to pursue undesirable behavior. If trade sanctions are to deter behavior in the future, they will have 
to be much more broadly targeted and enthusiastically implemented. 
One can question whether this was ever in the cards in the North Korean case. Clearly the United 
Nations had ratcheted up its response with each succeeding provocation, and Resolution 1695 established 
that China (and Russia) would no longer protect North Korea from sanctions in the Security Council. 
Yet it was also clear that they were less than enthusiastic in supporting the policy and would act as a brake 
on the United States and others. The real question then is less why sanctions were ineffective, but why US 
policymakers chose to go down a path that appears to have had little likelihood of reaching the desired 
outcome? 
APPENDIX: DOCUMENTATION
Data and Data Sources
Sample periods: For South Korea, 2001Q1–2007Q2. For China, 2000Q1–2007Q3.
Trade: For South Korea: Ministry of Unification. For China: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China.
Income: For South Korea: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, May 
2008. For China: IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 2008; CEIC, available at www.ceicdata.
com (accessed on December 10, 2008). For North Korea: Bank of Korea.      
Exchange Rate: Noland (2004); Good Friends, North Korea Today, various issues; NKNet, NK Brief, 
various issues; IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 2008.
Nuclear Sanctions: UN (2006).
Data Preparation 
Trade data: Trade with North Korea is recorded from North Korea’s trading partners’ perspective, in this 
case either China or South Korea. Trade data were originally recorded in monthly increments and were 
summed over quarters to get the quarterly numbers. Following conventional practice, the natural log of 
these quarterly totals is used as the dependent variable in the trade equations. 
Income data: South Korea’s quarterly real GDP data were calculated using nominal, quarterly, local-
currency GDP and deflating it by South Korea’s quarterly GDP deflator. A quarterly GDP deflator was 
unavailable for China, so real year-on-year quarterly GDP growth numbers from CEIC were applied to 
nominal quarterly GDP numbers to calculate real GDP for each quarter after the first year of the sample 
(2000). Chinese inflation in that year was negligible and does not distort subsequent observations. Both 
the nominal and real Chinese production data display strong seasonality. Annual observations on North 
Korea’s real GDP were interpolated to generate quarterly data. Again, following normal procedures, once 
quarterly real GDP has been calculated, an index is formed in which the first observation is set equal to 
100, and the natural log is used in the trade equations. 
Exchange rate data: Exchange rate data come from various sources and are originally priced in either US 
dollars (US$) or renminbi (RMB). We have found in the past that implied US$–RMB exchange rates, 
in terms of relative won prices, tend to be very close to actual dollar–RMB rates and are therefore willing 
to use the NK won–US$ exchange rate data to determine both RMB (where NK won–RMB data are 
not available) and NK won–SK won exchange rates. NK won is always in the numerator for our samples, 
and the exchange rate is indexed to 100 for the first observation of each sample. For use as an explanatory 
variable, in the absence of a relative price term, we take the natural log of this index used in the trade 
equation. 
Nuclear sanctions: UN Resolution 1718 (UN 2006) went into effect in October 2006. This dummy 
variable is equal to zero from the beginning of the sample through the second quarter of 2006 and equal 
to one from the third quarter of 2006 through the end of the sample period. 
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Table 1  Luxury goods ban lists
Luxury good          United States    European Union         Australia         Canada         Japan 
Food items Caviar and caviar 
substitutes
Truffles and preparations 
thereof
Caviar 
Crustaceans (all), e.g., 
rock lobsters,  
abalone 
Molluscs and aquatic 
invertebrates, e.g., 
oyster in any form 
Gourmet foods and 
ingredients
Lobster




Meat of bovine 
animals, frozen 
(beef)
Fish fillets, frozen 
(tuna)
Tobacco Tobacco and tobacco 
products
High-quality cigars and 
cigarillos
Tobacco products  Cigarettes Tobacco
Beverages Alcoholic beverages: 




wines), spirits, and 
spirituous beverages










Luxury perfumes, toilet 
waters and cosmetics, 
including beauty and 
make up products
Perfumes and toilet 
waters 
Cosmetics (all) 








Leather apparel and 
clothing accessories
High-quality garments, 
clothing accessories, and 
shoes (regardless of their 
material)
Designer clothing 
Fur Fur skins and artificial 
furs





Leather travel goods, 
vanity cases, binocular 
and camera cases, 
handbags, wallets, silk 
scarves
Leather travel goods, 







Transportation Luxury automobiles 
(and motor vehicles): 
automobiles and other 
motor vehicles to 
transport people (other 









Luxury vehicles for the 
transport of persons on 
earth, air, or sea, as well 
as their accessories and 
spare parts
Automobiles and 






Yachts and other 
aquatic recreational 
vehicles (such as 
personal watercraft)
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Table 1  Luxury goods ban lists (continued)
Luxury good       United States     European Union       Australia     Canada         Japan 
Flooring Rugs and tapestries Hand knotted carpets, 
hand-woven rugs, and 
tapestries
Carpets  Carpets and other 
textile floor coverings
Jewelry Jewelry with pearls, 
gems, precious and 
semi-precious stones 
(including diamonds, 
sapphires, rubies, and 
emeralds), jewelry 
of precious metal or 
of metal clad with 
precious metal
Pearls, precious and 
semi-precious stones, 
articles of pearls, 
jewellery, gold- or 
silversmith articles
Cutlery of precious 













Natural or cultured 
pearls, precious or 
semi-precious stones
Precious metals & 
metal work
Electronic items Flat-screen, plasma, 
or LCD panel 
televisions or other 




any television larger 








items for domestic use
Consumer electronics 
(televisions, videos, 
DVD players, PDAs, 
laptops, MP players, 



























Watches/clocks Luxury watches: 
Wrist, pocket, and 
others with a case 
of precious metal or 
of metal clad with 
precious metal
Luxury clocks and 
watches and their 
parts
Watches & clocks  Watches Wrist watches & other 
watches





than 00 years old), 
collectible items, 
including rare coins 
and stamps
Works of art, collectors 
pieces, and antiques
Coins and banknotes, 
not being legal tender
Works of art (all)  Works of art, 




Musical instruments High-quality musical 
instruments
Musical instruments; 
parts and accessories 
of such articles
table continues next page
Table 1  Luxury goods ban lists (continued)
Luxury good          United States    European Union         Australia         Canada         Japan 
Sports equipment Recreational sports 
equipment
Articles and 
equipment for skiing, 
golf, diving, and water 
sports
Sports equipment  Sporting goods
Fountain pens Fountain pens Fountain pens  Fountain pens
Drinking glasses Items of lead crystal High quality lead 
crystal glassware




Others Tableware of 
porcelain or bone 
China
High-quality tableware 
of porcelain, china, 




equipment for billiard, 
automatic bowling, 
casino games, and 






Table 2  China–North Korea trade, time trend, seasonal dummies, and nuclear sanctions
(2.1)  Log Chinese exports to North Korea  (2.2) Log Chinese imports from North Korea
Nuclear sanction  0.** Nuclear sanction  –0.0
(Dummy variable)  (0.) (Dummy variable)  (0.)
Logged time trend 0.*** Logged time trend 0.***
(0.0) (0.0)
Month  –0. Month  –0.*
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.** Month  –0.*
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month 0 –0.0 Month 0 –0.0
(0.)   (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  0.0
(0.) (0.)
Month  0. Month  0.
(0.) (0.)
Constant .*** Constant .***
(0.0) (0.0)
N  N 
r 0. r 0.
F . F .
p 0.00 p 0.00
Durbin–Watson d–statistic . Durbin–Watson d–statistic  .
Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.000 Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0.0000
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.000 Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0.0000
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Month   was omitted. 
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Table 2  China–North Korea trade, time trend, seasonal dummies, and nuclear sanctions      
  (continued)
(2.3)  Log Chinese exports to North Korea  (2.4) Log Chinese imports from North Korea
Nuclear sanction  0. Nuclear sanction  –0.
(Dummy variable)  (0.) (Dummy variable)  (0.)
Logged time trend 0.*** Logged time trend .***
(0.0) (0.)
Quarter  –0. Quarter  –0.0
(0.) (0.)
Quarter  0.0 Quarter  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Quarter  –0. Quarter  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Constant 0.*** Constant .***
(0.) (0.)
N  N .00
r 0. r 0.
F .0 F .0
p 0.00 p 0.00
Durbin–Watson d–statistic .0 Durbin–Watson d–statistic .0
Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.0 Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.00
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0. Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.0
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Quarter  was omitted.
 
Table 3  South Korea–North Korea trade, time trend, seasonal dummies, and nuclear sanctions
(3.1)  Log South Korean exports to North Korea  (3.2) Log South Korean imports from North Korea
Nuclear sanction  0. Nuclear sanction  0.***
(Dummy variable)  (0.) (Dummy variable)  (0.0)
Logged time trend 0.*** Logged time trend 0.***
(0.0) (0.0)
Month  –.0*** Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.** Month  –0.0*
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.* Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.*
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.*
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.*
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0.0 Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0. Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Month 0 –0. Month 0 0.0
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0. Month  0.
(0.) (0.)
Month  –0. Month  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Constant .*** Constant .0***
(0.0) (0.)
N 0 N 0
r 0.0 r 0.
F . F .
p 0.00 p 0.00
Durbin–Watson d–statistic . Durbin–Watson d–statistic .
Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0.000 Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0.0000
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.000 Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0.0000
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Month  was omitted.
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Table 3  South Korea–North Korea trade, time trend, seasonal dummies, and nuclear sanctions 
  (continued)
(3.3)  Log South Korean exports to North Korea  (3.4) Log South Korean imports from North Korea
Nuclear sanction  0.0 Nuclear sanction  0.**
(Dummy variable)  (0.) (Dummy variable)  (0.)
Logged time trend 0.*** Logged time trend 0.***
(0.0) (0.0)
Quarter  –0. Quarter  –0.*
(0.) (0.)
Quarter  0. Quarter  –0.**
(0.) (0.)
Quarter  0. Quarter  –0.
(0.) (0.)
Constant 0.*** Constant 0.***
(0.) (0.)
N .00 N 
r 0. r 0.
F . F .
p 0.00 p 0.00
Durbin–Watson d–statistic . Durbin–Watson d–statistic .
Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0. Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
0.
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
  0. Breusch–Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation, Prob > chi
 0.
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Quarter  was omitted.
Table 4  China–North Korea trade, activity variable included
Log Chinese exports to North Korea  (4.1) (4.2)
Nuclear sanctions 0. 0.
(0.) (0.)
Log North Korean GNI index .** 0.***
(.) (.)
Logged time trend  0.0
(0.)
Quarter  0.* 0.*
(0.) (0.)
Quarter  0.0 0.0
(0.) (0.)








Durbin–Watson d–statistic  .0 .
Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation, Prob  > chi 0.  0.
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi    0. 0.
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5  South Korea–North Korea trade, activity variable included
 Log South Korean exports to North Korea  (5.1) (5.2)
Nuclear sanctions –0.0 0.00
(0.) (0.)
Log North Korean GNI index . .***
(.) (.)
Logged time trend  0.
(0.0)
Quarter  0.** 0.0**
(0.0) (0.0)
Quarter  0.** 0.0**
(0.) (0.)








Durbin–Watson d–statistic .  .
Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi  0. 0.
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi  0. 0.
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6  Activity and exchange rate variables included
(6.1) Log Chinese exports to North Korea
Nuclear sanctions 0.
(0.)
Log North Korean GNI index .0**
(.)















Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi 0.0
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi 0.
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6  Activity and exchange rate variables included 
  (continued)
(6.2) Log South Korean exports to North Korea
Nuclear sanctions –0.0
(0.)
Log North Korean GNI index .0
(.0)















Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi  0.
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, Prob > chi  0.
* p<0.0, ** p<0.0, *** p<0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7  Differenced regressions
(7.1)  (7.2) 
Differenced log exports to North Korea  China  South Korea
Differenced log North Korean GNI index 0.** 0.
(.) (.00)
Nuclear sanctions  0. –0.
(0.0) (0.)






*** p<0.0, ** p<0.0, * p<0.
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Figure 2       China–North Korea trade, 2000–08
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Figure 3       South Korea–North Korea trade, 2001–08
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Figure 4       Small-country demand for imports